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IDS are essential components in preventing malicious traffic from penetrating networks. IDS 
have been rapidly enhancing their detection ability using ML algorithms. As a result, 
attackers look for new methods to evade the IDS. Polymorphic attacks are favorites among 
the attackers as they can bypass the IDS. GAN is a method proven in generating various forms 
of data. It is becoming popular among security researchers as it can produce indistinguishable 
data from the original data. I proposed a model to generate DDoS attacks using a WGAN. I 
used several techniques to update the attack feature profile and generate polymorphic data. 
This data will change the feature profile in every cycle to test if the IDS can detect the new 
version attack data. Simulation results from the proposed model show that by continuous 
changing of attack profiles, defensive systems that use incremental learning will still be 
vulnerable to new attacks. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The Internet is being used in many fields, like data transfer, e-learning, and many more, 
and its growth has impacted all aspects of life. This increasing usage of the Internet causes 
concerns about network security and needs constant improvements in securing Internet 
technologies from various attacks. Examples of these attacks include DDoS attacks, Man-
in-the-middle attacks, Phishing, Password-based attack, SQL injection, and many more. 
Network vulnerabilities can cause damage to small or large organizations. According to 
one survey, 98% of businesses in the UK depend on Information Technology services. 
Over 43% of small scale and 72% of large-scale organizations suffered from cyber-attacks 
in the past years  [1]. There are many tools available to secure or prevent cyber-security 
attacks, including but not limited to:  Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) , Intrusion 
Prevention Systems (IPS), Anti-malware, Network Access Control, Firewalls. Among 
those, one of the most commonly used and effective tool is the Intrusion Detection System.  
 
Figure 1: How IDS works? 
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IDS analyzes the traffic data to distinguish between malicious and normal traffic and 
generate alerts so that necessary precautions can be carried out to prevent damage [2]. With 
the advancement in network attacks, the security detections and prevention systems are 
also improving. Artificial Intelligence (AI) is now commonly used in defensive measures 
in IDS [3], and attackers have also started to use AI techniques for generating malicious 
attacks [4], [5].  
AI and machine learning algorithms need a large amount of data to train and test the 
models. Some techniques that can be used to generate large datasets include malware 
detection on endpoints [6], [7], security orchestration [8], and SIEM [9], [10]. Many 
network attack datasets [11], [12], [13] are also available on the Internet. Therefore, 
researchers can develop a model to test and train detection and prevention systems to 
improve the security of the network. Just as such, malware authors or attackers also use 
machine learning techniques to generate synthetic/adversarial network attack data to 
evaluate the security systems [4], [5]. Adversarial samples are data that can cause a 
machine-learning algorithm to misclassify the attack. 
One of the frameworks to generate adversarial data is Generative Adversarial Networks 
(GAN). It is an architecture that consists of two neural networks: the Generator and the 
Discriminator. The Generator uses gradient descent or the response from the discriminator 
and generates adversarial data. The discriminator distinguishes between the original and 
the adversarial data. The Generator and the discriminator compete in this way, and, in the 
end, the Generator produces synthetic or adversarial data [14]. GAN has been utilized in 
research to generate various types of datasets like images [15], sound [16], text [17], and 
network attack data [18].  
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1.2 Polymorphic Attacks 
Polymorphic is a term that consists of a vital keyword, morph, which means changing 
the form. In the context of network security, polymorphic attacks refer to the type of attack 
that mutates attack signatures to evade the detection techniques. The polymorphic attack 
mutates in such a way that it maintains functionality. The polymorphic engine is employed 
to change the signature of the attack, as shown in the following image. 
The polymorphic property of attacks makes old detection signatures obsolete [19].  
Attackers continuously find new ways to manipulate attacks using various technologies to 
evade the detection systems. These types of attacks are specifically deployed when the 
detection system uses signature-based pattern matching techniques. The first known 
polymorphic attack was used to generate malicious URLs for a phishing attack [19]. That 
evades the signature-based anti-phishing defense systems, and defense systems are unable 
to blacklist malicious URLs.  
1.3 Motivation 
The amount of research that produces adversarial attack data using machine learning 
and AI methods is limited and mostly in specific formats like image, text, and sound. For 
example, according to surveys, phishing attacks are automated using adversarial AI [20], 
[21] suggested that attackers are using GAN to generate the voice of a group of people to 
breach the security access. However, it is essential to understand that results of machine 
learning classifiers are skeptical in terms of network security.  
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Furthermore, in network security, some of the tasks involve attackers' efforts that evade 
the detection systems. We state that it is vital for the network designers to ensure various 
techniques that an adversary/attacker can adapt to evade the detection system. 
Moreover, the DDoS attacks are the most common to generate using simple scripting 
tools like Slowloris [22], Goldeneye [23], Hulk [24]. Apart from that, these attacks mostly 
target specific organizations and need fewer resources to produce attacks.  
Based on these motivations, I assume that an attacker is able to manipulate the behavior 
of the network attack in such a way that maintains the intensity of the attack but can be 
misclassified as a regular network flow. Furthermore, Wasserstein GAN [25] is the favored 
method that an attacker can use to generate a synthetic attack. It can also be useful in 
manipulating the attack data classified as the regular network flow. This architecture will 
be useful for the network security tool designers to prepare for such unknown, polymorphic 
attacks. 
1.4 Related Works 
1.4.1 Evolution of Network Datasets 
Network security has always been crucial, and it is essential to offer a standard of 
protection to every network service. Researchers have been collecting and developing 
network attack datasets using different scenarios and environment settings to evaluate 
different defensive models. A dataset has real information collected from the devices in the 
form of packets or logs that could help learn the patterns in network flow and is used as a 
baseline to determine if there is an anomaly in the network traffic. 
A survey in [26] represents various datasets based on the network that has been 
operational for many years; it also compares and explains the datasets in brief. One 
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commonly applied dataset is KDD Cup 1999, which was collected in MIT Lincoln Labs 
by DARPA. It consists of Denial of Service, user-to-root, Remote to Local, and Probing 
attacks.  
ECML-PKDD 2007 dataset was collected for a conference on Machine Learning by 
the EU. That has attacks such as Cross-Site Scripting, SQL Injection, XPATH Injection, 
and command execution. This dataset was compiled in the XML format. Another Data set 
covered by this research paper is HTTP CSIC 2010 [27], prepared by the Spanish Research 
National Council. That consists of regular and anomalous HTTP requests and contains 
attack types like SQL Injection, CSS Scripting, Buffer Overflows, and so forth. 
As the detection systems evolved with time, various attacks also emerged that could 
compromise networking systems. The dataset needs to be updated with the latest attack 
features. Canadian Institute for Cyber Security developed a dataset from real-time 
simulations. They have published various datasets involving numerous attacks like 
Android malware, Botnet, DOS, DDoS, and many more. Intrusion Detection, Evaluation 
dataset known as CICIDS2017 [13] contains benign data and commonly known attacks 
like Brute Force SSH, DOS, Web Attack, Botnet, and DDoS. To produce a reliable data 
set, authors have considered critical criteria like complete network configuration, complete 
traffic, labeled dataset, complete interaction, complete capture, available protocols, attack 
diversity, feature set, which consists of more than 80 features, and metadata. None of the 
previous datasets have considered these benchmarks. 
1.4.2 Advancements in Network Security 
Network security has been a significant research trend for the past few decades. AI and 
Machine Learning are the main areas of research in network security. Li et al. proposed a 
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framework to evaluate the risk of network security using Support Vector Machine [28]. 
Machine Learning and AI algorithms are efficient and flexible to deploy. However, a 
survey [29] proposed by Guan et al. explains that there are some issues in machine learning 
itself, like data poisoning while training the model that can affect the overall performance 
of the framework. They have also suggested a possible solution to avoid data poisoning. 
There are various machine learning approaches that can detect network anomalies 
discussed in [30] and the performance comparison of these techniques.  
IDS is an essential part of network security, and to improve the functionalities and 
ability of the IDS, researchers have been working on various techniques. For instance, [31] 
authors proposed a kernel-based IDS that can detect anomalies like DDoS attacks. It uses 
the K-means clustering technique to classify between adversarial and standard examples. 
There are two techniques used by IDSs to detect various attacks, Signature-based detection 
and anomaly-based detection. The first technique analyzes a network for a specific pattern 
of predefined attack. The limitation of this technique is that it is unable to detect an 
unknown attack. The second method classifies the network flow data into standard and 
anomalous data. This technique uses statistical methods, machine learning in IDS.  
ML algorithms like Random Forest, Decision Tree, Support Vector Machines are being 
used for anomaly detection [32]. However, most of them resulted in lower accuracy. A 
Study in [32] analyzes challenges on anomaly detection by using Deep Learning techniques 
based on semi-supervised learning. Results show that using an Auto Encoder technique, 
and the model gets reasonable detection accuracy with a fair amount of training data. A 
survey [33] represents using various machine learning classifiers like Support Vector 
Machine, K-nearest Neighbor, Decision Tree in IDS classification. A review by [34] 
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represents the role of machine learning techniques like Supervised, Unsupervised, and 
Hybrid classifiers in IDS and in creating AI-based attacks. Kumar et al. [35] proposed a 
model that uses Deep Learning to prevent DDoS attacks. 
A recent survey [36] points towards the recent developments and shortcomings in IDS. 
It suggests that the main concern with the latest IDS is that they tend to alarm on fake attack 
data, which is a result of high false positives in terms of machine learning. Furthermore, it 
compares the detection rate and accuracy between various machine learning techniques 
like ANN, SVM, Naïve Bayes, Random Forest, and AdaBoost. 
Various studies explain techniques to reduce the false-positive rate. For example, [37] 
proposed a model that applied a genetic feature selection technique. That specifies only the 
most essential features from the dataset that needs to be used to train the model. In addition 
to that, it uses a Support Vector Machine algorithm to classify the network flow data. 
Another research [38] developed a framework that uses the Random Forest technique to 
improve the false-positive rate. This method follows a multi-layer classification approach, 
in which the classifier first distinguishes if the incoming data is attack or not. If it is an 
attack, it will be further simplified by type of it. To balance the classification of attack 
types, they have used a cluster-based under-sampling method. 
1.4.3 Attacks using Generative Adversarial Networks 
With the recent developments towards machine learning techniques, intrusion detection 
systems are getting advanced with these methods. However, there is limited research 
testing the integrity of the advanced IDS against adversarial data. 
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According to a study by [39], the authors created a framework that generates adversarial 
malware using GAN to bypass the detection system. The objective of this research is to use 
a black-box malware detector because most of the attackers are unaware of the detection 
techniques used in the detection system. Instead of directly attacking the black-box 
detector, researchers created a model that can observe the target system with corresponding 
data. Then this model calculates the gradient computation from the GAN to create 
adversarial malware data. With this technique, the authors received a model accuracy of 
around 98%. 
Some researchers have also examined the same methodology in generating adversarial 
attacks for Android applications. [40] Presented a model to generate adversarial android 
malware using Generative Adversarial Networks. The model consists of the Generator, the 
discriminator, and Malware Detector. The Generator gets a random noise vector and 
produces the adversarial data. The discriminator gets benign data and adversarial malware 
and then differentiates between real and perturbed data. The discriminator provides 
feedback in the form of loss to the generator. If the generated sample is distinguishable, it 
will increase loss and decrease it otherwise. They have used various classifiers like Support 
Vector Machine, Random Forest, Logistic Regression as the machine learning classifiers 
for the GAN model. 
1.4.4 Prior work on the use of WGAN in security 
This section covers some previous works on generating adversarial attack data using 
the Wasserstein GAN. The Wasserstein GAN model was introduced in [25], and it 
improves upon the traditional GAN. Wasserstein GAN is an extension of traditional GAN 
that finds an alternate method of training the Generator. In WGAN the Discriminator 
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provides a critic score that depicts how real or fake the data generated. More detailed 
information about this method, which is used in this research, is provided in Section 2.5.  
To generate a malicious file [18] proposed a method that uses WGAN so that a 
detection system signifies the adversarial malicious file as a regular file. They have 
achieved an accuracy of around 99%, proving that their method can generate adversarial 
malicious files that can bypass the detection system. 
A recent study in [41] uses Wasserstein GAN to generate simulated attack data. 
According to the authors, many tools can generate simulated attack data. However, this 
process could take a long time and a lot of resources. Using the proposed technique, they 
have produced millions of connection records with just one device and within a short 
period. They used the KDD Cup 1999 dataset as the training set. Their experiment suggests 
that as compared to GAN, the Wasserstein GAN learns faster and generates better results. 
A paper published by Ring et al. [42] proposed a method that produces flow-based 
attack data using Wasserstein GAN. This research uses the CIDDS dataset to test and train 
the proposed method. They have suggested that the flow-based dataset consists of 
categorical features like IP address, port numbers, etc. The GAN is unable to process 
categorical data. They have also proposed a method to preprocess the categorical data and 
transform them into continuous data. Lastly, they have used several techniques to evaluate 
the quality standard of the adversarial data. Results suggest that it is possible to generate 
real network data using this method. 
A recently published paper by Lin et al. [43] discussed the benefits of WGAN. It 
proposed a technique IDSGAN to generate adversarial attack data and test the attack 
 
10 
against the Intrusion Detection System. They have utilized the NSL-KDD as the 
benchmark dataset to generate an adversarial attack on an IDS. They have tested this 
technique with various machine learning classifiers like Support Vector Machine, Naïve 
Bayes, Multilayer Perceptron, Linear Regression, Decision Tree, Random Forrest. They 
have used four types of attacks, Probe, DoS, User to Root, Root to Local to generate 
adversarial attack data. 
1.5 Research Gap 
Some work in generating adversarial attack using GAN are focusing on generating 
adversarial data and test if the IDS can detect the attack. It was found that most of them do 
not focus on training the IDS with adversarial data generated by the GAN and test if the 
IDS can detect similar kinds of attacks in the following cycles. The prior research is also 
lacking the idea of polymorphic attacks, i.e., to update the feature profile by manipulating 
the features of training data and try to generate a new variety of adversarial data to evaluate 
the IDS. Apart from that, some researches are based on the GAN model developed by 
Goodfellow et al. [14]. Research shows that this traditional variant of GAN does not scale 
with a large dataset, so it is unstable with large scale applications [44]. 
1.6 Aim and Objective 
This research aims to generate an AI-based adversarial DDoS attack using GAN. 
Moreover, this attack will be profile-based, which means the attack will change its feature 
profile for a certain period. To automate the updating of the feature profile, I have used the 
Reinforcement Learning technique. That will evaluate the success rate of the attack on IDS 
and update the feature profile as it moves forward. 
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The objective of the thesis is to build a model that generates automated feature profile 
based polymorphic DDoS attacks and evaluates if it can evade the IDS. This work also 
includes monitoring the performance of the GAN model, for how many cycles the 
polymorphic adversarial DDoS attack can evade the IDS. I have also used a feature 
selection technique, SHAP [45] (SHapley Additive exPlanations), to distinguish essential 
features from the entire dataset. 
1.7 Thesis Contributions  
This research aims to create a framework that generates adversarial polymorphic DDoS 
attacks using GAN, motivated by [43].  
 This work begins with the important feature selection method using SHAP. I have 
identified the most critical features from the dataset that contribute to a DDoS 
attack. 
 The next goal is to Generate adversarial data using the selected feature set and 
evaluate the IDS if it can detect the adversarial attack, followed by training the IDS 
with the generated adversarial data.  
 I propose a polymorphic engine that updates the feature profile of the attack. There 
are two types of polymorphic engine, 
1) Manual feature update – In this technique, I will manually select and add new 
features in the training set after every adversarial DDoS attack and IDS training 
cycle. Another variant of the feature profile update is to shuffle the new features 
with the old features. I have used this technique as a baseline to evaluate the 
performance of the model. 
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2) Automated feature update – In this case, I use the Reinforcement Learning 
method to update the feature profile after every adversarial DDoS attack and 
IDS training cycle. 
 I have conducted a comprehensive simulation and analyzed the results to compare 
the Reinforcement Learning method against the Manual Feature profile attacks and 
presented how many cycles an attacker can bypass an IDS with polymorphic 
adversarial DDoS attacks. 
1.8 Thesis Outline 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 consists of a brief introduction 
to GAN, previous work that utilizes GAN to produce synthetic data, and an introduction to 
Wasserstein GAN. A detail about the dataset used in this research and feature selection 
techniques are discussed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 explains the proposed methods that 
generate an adversarial polymorphic DDoS attack and automation of attack feature update 
profile using Reinforcement Learning. Chapter 5 describes the experiment environment, 
experiment scenarios, and analysis of this work. Chapter 6 concludes the work with 
suggested future work.  
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Chapter 2. Generative Adversarial Networks  
2.1 Introduction 
Generative Adversarial Network is a paradigm based on machine learning models that 
can generate synthetic data from the original input data. It consists of two neural networks 
known as the Generator and the discriminator. It was proposed by Goodfellow et al. [14] 
at the University of Montreal. 
2.1.1 Discriminator 
The discriminator can be simply called a classifier that distinguishes the generated data 
as original or fake. The discriminator takes two forms of data, original data, and the data 
generated by the Generator. 
 
    Figure 2: Backpropagation in the Discriminator [46] 
The discriminator uses original data as a positive example and generated data as 
negative/adversarial examples during training. LD represents the penalty to the 
discriminator when the discriminator cannot detect or correctly differentiate the data; the 
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penalty increases and decreases otherwise. To update the weights of the discriminator, it 
uses backpropagation. Another loss LG represents a loss of the Generator [46]. 
2.1.2 Generator 
The generator produces a synthetic set of data by receiving feedback from the 
discriminator and learns to produce data so that the discriminator classifies the synthetic 
data as the original. 
 
   Figure 3: Backpropagation in the Generator [46] 
The training of the Generator includes steps as follows. 
1) A random input noise. 
2) The Generator to produce data from the random data. 
3) The discriminator, to distinguish the data and the output from the 
discriminator. 




2.2 Training the GAN 
As discussed, there are two variants of neural networks in the GAN, so it needs to train 
the Generator and the discriminator alternately. Also, it is hard to check if the GAN is 
converged or not. The alternative training works as follows. 
1) Training of the Generator runs for some epochs. 
2) Training of the discriminator runs for some epochs. 
3) Continue repeating steps 1 and 2 until the GAN converges. 
To train the GAN better, we need to keep either of the neural networks constant. For 
instance, while training the Generator, we need to keep the discriminator constant; 
otherwise, it will be difficult to converge [47]. While training the discriminator, the 
Generator needs to be constant because it needs to learn to differentiate between the 
generated and fake data. 
2.3 Loss Function 
The loss function represents the difference value between the generated data and the 





𝑉(𝐷, 𝐺) =   𝐸𝑥~𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 (𝑥) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐷(𝑥) + 𝐸𝑧~𝑝𝑧 (𝑧) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 1 − 𝐷 𝐺(𝑧)      (1) 
[14] discusses a loss function named min-max loss. Authors trained the discriminator 
D to maximize the average of the 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐷(𝑥) , with D(x) denoting the estimated probability 
of data being recognized as original data and the  𝑙𝑜𝑔 1 − 𝐷 𝐺(𝑧)  , with D(G(z)) 
denoting the estimated probability of data being recognized as synthetic. Moreover, the 
authors concurrently train the generator G  seeks to minimize the log(1−D(G(z))) predicted 
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by the discriminator for synthetic data. The discriminator D and the generator  G plays a 
min-max game with the following value function V(D, G). 
Here, EX represents the expected value over the original data. D(x) is the approximation 
that if the original data is real or not. G(z) represents the output from the Generator from 
the noise z. D(G(z)) is the approximate value of the discriminator that the generated data is 
real, pz(z) is input noise variables. Furthermore, EZ represents the expected value of the 
random data inputs to the Generator. To minimize the loss of the Generator, we need to 
minimize the value of the log(1 - D(G(z)). Lower loss of G means the generator is 
producing synthetic data that can be classified as the Original. 
2.4 Generating data using GAN 
Generative Adversarial Networks are useful to generate numerous types of information 
in the form of images, sound, text, etc. This section shows several use cases in the field of 
data generation using GANs.  
In computer vision, image generation using Machine Learning is becoming popular. 
According to [48], there is not much attention given to the gaming domain in the form of 
sprite generation. A sprite is a two-dimensional bitmap that can be integrated to generate a 
large screen in 2-D games. In [48], the authors proposed a framework based on Deep 
Convolutional GAN to generate new sprites. They have used three types of custom datasets 
that consist of human-like characters, faces, and creatures. The architecture of the Deep 




Figure 4: Generating Images using DCGAN [48] 
The role of the Generator is to create random data in the form of images and keep 
improving the quality of an image by getting feedback from the Discriminator using 
backpropagation. The Discriminator then distinguishes the image from the generated data 
and training data. In the beginning, the Generator produces image samples that are easily 
classified by the Discriminator as fake. Afterward, the continuous training of the Generator 
improves the quality of an image that will be difficult to distinguish as fake. 
Another exciting research domain is generating or manipulating text data using 
machine learning. Generating a text is more difficult because of the structure or the 
property of the Neural Networks. While training, Neural Network produces a new word by 
predicting previously generated words. However, with a lengthy list of words, the neural 
network will become uncertain and prone to errors [49]. To overcome the given situation, 
a recently published paper [49] proposed an architecture based on GAN to generate text 
called “tranGAN”.  
Unlike traditional GAN, this proposed model has two generators; backward Generator 
and forward Generator. The backward Generator produces the first part of the sentence and 
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the second half is by the forward Generator. In comparison, the role of the discriminator is 
to differentiate between the original and the generated sentence. 
Previous research [40], [44], [47] suggests that training a traditional GAN is hard. The 
most common problems are as follows. 
Convergence problem - When the Generator gets better, the classification performance 
of the discriminator decreases in the following cycles. Training the GAN from this point 
means the generator trains from the less meaningful data; this state is known as the 
Convergence problem.  
Mode Collapse – In ideal conditions, the GAN can produce a good variety of data. 
However, if a generator learns to produce a specific set of data so that the discriminator 
classifies them like the original, then the Generator will only produce these sets of data and 
easily deceive the discriminator. This condition is called mode collapse. 
2.5 Wasserstein GAN 
To overcome these issues, Arjovsky et al. proposed a method known as Wasserstein 
GAN [25]. Wasserstein GAN provides a better approximation of distributed data that was 
given in the training set. WGAN uses a discriminator with a critic that provides a score of 
how real or fake generated data is. In contrast, a discriminator in traditional GAN predicts 




Figure 5: Network Diagram of WGAN 
In this diagram, fD loss represents a Loss function that provides critique values for the 
Discriminator, and fG loss represents a Loss function for the generator. The following are the 
differences in the implementation of WGAN. A critic score < 0 depicts the real data, and a 
score > 0 depicts the fake or synthetic data. 
1) A linear Activation function is being used in WGAN, whereas GAN uses Sigmoid 
as the activation function. 
2) It trains or updates the Discriminator/Critic multiple times compared to Generator 
in each cycle. 
Two loss functions WGAN uses are Discriminator/Critic Loss and Generator Loss that 
is as following.  
LD = 𝛻   ∑  [ 𝑓 (𝑥
( ))  −  𝑓 (𝑔 (𝑧( ))) ]                          (2) 
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This function [25] specifies the Discriminator/Critic loss that can be simplified as a 
difference between the average critic score of real data and the average critic score of fake 
data. Here, 𝑓 (𝑥( )) represents an average critic score on real data and 𝑓 (𝑔 (𝑧( ))) ] 
represents an average critic score on fake/generated data.  
  LG = 𝛻   ∑  𝑓 𝑔 𝑧
( )                                   (3)  
 The above function specifies the Generator loss that can be simplified as “1 – average 
critic score of fake data”. Where, 𝑓 𝑔 𝑧( )  depicts the average critic score of fake 
data. Overall contributions of the WGAN are that their experiments do not have the mode 
collapse, and the Generator learns well even if the critic accurately discriminates the 
adversarial data. Both the loss functions motivate a separation between a score for synthetic 
data and real data, which is not necessarily positive and negative [50]. 
It suffices to say that WGAN has been proven to generate high-quality synthetic attack 
data. I have followed a similar methodology to generate synthetic DDoS attack data. The 




Chapter 3. Dataset and Feature Selection 
3.1 Dataset 
I use a dataset published by the Canadian Institute of Cyber Security, CIC-IDS2017, 
published in [13] by Lashkari et al., which,  according to the authors, supersedes the 
datasets generated earlier by the institute. CICIDS2017 consists of eight different files that 
contain regular traffic and attack traffic data. The following table represents the activity 
captured in each file. 
Table 1: Description of files from CICIDS2017 
 NAME OF FILES  DAY ACTIVITY  ATTACKS FOUND 
1 Monday 
WorkingHours.pcap_ISCX.csv 















4 Thursday-working hours 
Morning-WebAttacks.pcap_ 
ISCX.csv 
Thursday  Benign, 
Web Attack – Brute 
Force, 
Web Attack – SQL 
Injection, 
Web Attack – XSS 
5 Thursday-working hours 
Afternoon-Infilteration.pcap_ 
ISCX.csv 
Thursday  Benign, 
Infiltration 
6 Friday-working hours 
Morning.pcap_ISCX.csv 










Friday  Benign, 
DDoS 
 
Following is the table that depicts the properties of the dataset. 
Table 2: Properties of CICIDS2017 Dataset 
# FEATURE VALUES 
1 Total number of flows  2830540 
2 Total number of features  83 
3 Number of classes/labels 15 
 
Moreover, this dataset consists of various types of attacks along with the normal 
network flow. The following table consists of the attack and benign labels available in the 
dataset. 
Table 3: Different labels in CICIDS2017 
# NORMAL / ATTACK LABELS NUMBER OF FLOWS 
1  BENIGN  2359087  
2  Bot  1966  
3  DDoS  41835  
4  DoS GoldenEye  10293  
5  DoS Hulk  231072  
6  DoS Slow httptest  5499  
7  DoS slowloris  5796  
8  FTP-Patator  7938  
9  Heartbleed  11  
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10  Infiltration  36  
11  PortScan  158930  
12  SSH-Patator  5897  
13  Web Attack – Brute Force  1507  
14  Web Attack – SQL Injection  21  
15  Web Attack – XSS 652 
 
Moreover, this dataset also covers all the available standard protocols like HTTP, 
HTTPS, FTP, SSH, and email protocols. 
3.2 Features in the Dataset 
The dataset consists of more than 70 features that are important as per the latest network 
standards, and most of them were not available in the previously known datasets. Following 
is the list of the features.  
   Table 4: List of features in CICIDS2017 
No. Feature No. Feature No.  Feature 
1 Flow Duration 27 Bwd IAT Std 53 Avg Fwd Segment Size 
2 Total Fwd Packets 28 Bwd IAT Max 54 Avg Bwd Segment Size 
3 Total Bwd Packets 29 Bwd IAT Min 55 Fwd Avg Bytes/Bulk 
4 Total len of Fwd Packet 30 Fwd PSH Flags 56 Fwd Avg Packets/Bulk 
5 Total len of Bwd Packet 31 Bwd PSH Flags 57 Fwd Avg Bulk Rate 
6 Fwd Packet Length Max 32 Fwd URG Flags 58 Bwd Avg Bytes/Bulk 
7 Fwd Packet Length Min 33 Bwd URG Flags 59 Bwd Avg Packets/Bulk 
8 Fwd Packet Length Mean 34 Fwd Header Length 60 Bwd Avg Bulk Rate 
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9 Fwd Packet Length Std 35 Bwd Header Length 61 Subflow Fwd Packets 
10 Bwd Packet Length Max 36 Fwd Packets/s 62 Subflow Fwd Bytes 
11 Bwd Packet Length Min 37 Bwd Packets/s 63 Subflow Bwd Packets 
12 Bwd Packet Length Mean 38 Min Packet Length 64 Subflow Bwd Bytes 
13 Bwd Packet Length Std 39 Max Packet Length 65 Init_Win_bytes_fwd 
14 Flow Bytes/s 40 Packet Length Mean 66 Act_data_pkt_fwd 
15 Flow Packets/s 41 Packet Length Std 67 Min_seg_size_fwd 
16 Flow IAT Mean 42 Packet Len. Variance 68 Active Mean 
17 Flow IAT Std 43 FIN Flag Count 69 Active Std 
18 Flow IAT Max 44 SYN Flag Count 70 Active Max 
19 Flow IAT Min 45 RST Flag Count 71 Active Min 
20 Fwd IAT Total 46 PSH Flag Count 72 Idle Mean 
21 Fwd IAT Mean 47 ACK Flag Count 73 Idle Packet 
22 Fwd IAT Std 48 URG Flag Count 74 Idle Std 
23 Fwd IAT Max 49 CWE Flag Count 75 Idle Max 
24 Fwd IAT Min 50 ECE Flag Count 76 Idle Min 
25 Bwd IAT Total 51 Down/Up Ratio 77 Label 
26 Bwd IAT Mean 52 Average Packet Size   
 
3.3 Feature Selection  
Feature selection is an essential aspect of the machine learning technique. If we train 
the model without determining the critical features of the dataset, the predicted results will 
have more noise and uncertain results. Moreover, while using a dataset with a high number 
of feature sets, it is unnecessary to use all the available features because the machine 
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learning method uses more resources and time to process a large volume of feature sets. 
There are several techniques to select important features from a dataset. Shikh et al. [51] 
mentioned three methods to select features based on the type of dataset that are as follows. 
(1) Univariate Selection – This method can select those features that have the most stable 
relationship with the output variable. 
(2) Feature Importance – This method will be used to extract the features by their 
importance; it means every feature from the dataset will be given an importance score 
to determine the required features from the dataset. 
(3) Correlation Matrix with Heatmap – This method states the relationship of the 
features to each other and the output variable using the Heatmap. A value of a 
correlation can be positive or negative according to the importance of the feature.  
3.3.1 Feature Selection using SHAP 
SHAP (Shapley Additive exPlanations) [44] is one of the new feature selection 
techniques. The goal of the proposed method is to signify the contribution of each feature 
to the predicted value. Two critical measures to define feature importance are Consistency 
and Accuracy. The authors of the paper discuss that SHAP is the method that satisfies these 
qualities. The SHAP values explained by the authors are based on Shapley values that are 
a concept from game theory. The idea behind Shapely values is that the outcome of each 
possible combination (or coalition) of each feature needs to be examined to determine the 
importance of a single feature. The mathematical explanation of this is as follows: 
𝑔(𝑧 ) =  𝜙 +  ∑ 𝜙 𝑧                   (4) 
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Here, g represents the overall result of the Shapely values, z’ϵ {0, 1}M is a coalition 
vector, M is the max coalition size, and 𝜙  represents the presence of feature j that 
contributes towards the final output. The authors have described a coalition vector as 
simplified features in the paper. In coalition vector, 0 means the corresponding value is 
“not present” and 1 means it is “present.” 
Equation 4 can be called a power set and can be explained as a tree as follows. 
 
Figure 6: Power set of features 
Each node here represents a coalition of features. Edges represent the inclusion of a 
feature that was not present in the previous coalition. Equation 4 trains each coalition in 
the power set of the features to find the most critical feature from the dataset. 
3.3.2 Benefits of SHAP 
The advantages of using SHAP are as follows: 
1) Global Interpretability: This technique provides essential features from a dataset 
and a contribution of each feature for a target result and effect of the feature. To 
calculate global importance, we need to find an average of SHAP values. 
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                       𝐼 =  ∑ |ϕ𝑗
(𝑖)
|         (5)      
2) Local Interpretability: With this method, we can get an impact of an individual 
feature across the whole dataset. 
3.3.3 Features Selected by SHAP 
I ran the SHAP explainability model on the CICIDS2017 data file. The following 
results were obtained that show the list of essential features responsible for the DDoS attack 
in the order of most important to least important.  
 
Figure 7: Feature Importance using SHAP 
The result does not show enough information apart from the feature importance. 
However, another plot is known as a summary plot that can represent an effect of the 
feature, either positive or negative, on the result. Furthermore, the dark red color represents 
a higher impact of a feature, and the blue color represents a lower impact of a feature on 




   Figure 8: Summary Plot with Feature Impact using SHAP 
So, from the results, I have used these features like functional features that contribute 
to the DDoS attacks.  
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Chapter 4. Proposed Framework  
In this chapter, I will discuss the methodologies used in this research. It involves the 
Generative Adversarial model that produces adversarial attacks, training the IDS with 
previously generated polymorphic data, the polymorphic engine to generate polymorphic 
DDoS attacks, and use the polymorphic data to attack the IDS. 
4.1 Adversarial Attack Generation using Wasserstein GAN 
In this section, I will discuss the first stage of the framework, i.e., Generate the 
adversarial attack. 
For this work, I have used DDoS attack data from the CICIDS2017 [13] to train the 
model. To generate an adversarial attack, I  considered a combination of a random noise 
vector of the same size as the selected features from the dataset.  
The Generator in this framework is a feed-forward neural network that consists of 5 
linear layers. The input layer consists of neurons as per the selected number of features, 
and the output layer consists of 1 neuron. 
 
Figure 9: Neural network of the Generator 
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The input layer receives several numbers of features according to the experiment, and 
the output layer generates the desired data. The Generator consists of 3 hidden layers that 
are optimal for this scenario; my results showed fewer layers would underfit the training 
data. Anything more than that overfits the training data.  
In the next step, the generated adversarial attack combined with the benign or normal 
network flow data will be fed to the Intrusion Detection System.  
  
   Figure 10: Training the Black-box IDS                   
The IDS will detect the attack and sends predicted labels to the Discriminator, the 
detection success rate, and the Discriminator will send the critique to the Generator using 
the backpropagation so that in the next cycle, the Generator can improve the production of 
adversarial DDoS attack. The IDS consists of 4 layers, from which the input and output 
layer consists of 2 neurons each. The IDS consists of 2 hidden layers that are ideal because 




Figure 11: Neural network of the IDS and the Discriminator 
There are two types of IDS available, i.e., white-box IDS and black-box DIS. I used a 
signature-based black-box intrusion detection system to test the detection rate of the 
adversarial DDoS attacks. The reason for using this is that most of the time, the type of 
attack detection system is unknown to the attackers. Attackers rely on the responses 
received from the detection system, and black-box IDS is the right choice for this model. 
Finally, the Critic or Discriminator consists of 4 layers. The input layer accepts two 
types of data from the black-box IDS. The output layer provides two critics, one for the 
Generator and one for itself.  
To calculate the Loss, I have used loss functions [43] for the Generator and the 
discriminator, which are as follows. 




   Figure 12: Generating Adversarial DDoS Attack  
Here, PG represents the Penalty to the Generator. M is an m-dimensional attack vector, 
and N is an n-dimensional noise vector. E is the estimated value over the random inputs to 
the Generator. Sattack represents. The lesser the penalty to the Generator means it is 
performing well and produces attack data that can bypass the IDS.  
  P = 𝐴 ∈ 𝐷(𝑠)  + 𝐴 ∈  −  𝐸 ∈  𝐷(𝑠)      (7)   
Here, PD represents the Penalty to the discriminator. “E” is the overall estimated feature 
values of the generated attack data. “A” is the actual feature value of benign and the attack 
data. The lesser the penalty to the discriminator means the discriminator performs well. It 




Algorithm – 1 shows the process that was represented in figure–11. 
Algorithm 1: Adversarial Attack Generation 
Input: 
 Generator – noise vector N, DDoS Attack Data 
 Critic / Discriminator - Sattack, and Sbenign 
Output: 
 Trained Critic / Discriminator and Generator 
 1:  for epochs = 1, … , MAX EPOCHS do  
2:  for G-iterations, do 
3:   Generator creates adversarial network attacks using Sattack, and 
    Update the penalty using PG function once it receives the critique. 
4:  end loop 
5: While generating adversarial DDoS data and feed the data to IDS to test if                                                       
     it detects the attack. 
6:  for D-iterations, do 
7:    receive detected labels from the IDS and sends a critic to the Generator. 
   Update the penalty using PD function. 
8:    end loop 
9: end loop 
 
4.2 How the Generator fabricate an adversarial attack 
In this section, I will specify the details about the learning process of the Generator and 
how it produces adversarial data. 
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If the generator continuously generates random data, the data will be unmeaningful, 
which can change the entire network flow data. So, the Generator needs to produce the data 
to maintain the intensity of an attack. To ensure that, we need to maintain the feature values 
constant that have higher SHAP values. As seen in Figures 7 and 8, the following are the 
features that need to be constant. 
 Fwd Packet Length Max – Max packet size sent in a forward direction 
 Flow Duration – Duration of the flow in milliseconds 
 Avg Fwd Segment Size – Average segment size sent in a forward direction 
 Total Length of Fwd Packets – Total length of packets sent in a forward direction 
 Bwd Packet Length Std – Standard packet size sent in a backward direction 
 Average Packet Size – Average size of a packet while in transmission 
 Avg Bwd Segment Size – Average segment size sent backward direction 
 Packet Length Std – Standard deviation of packet length 
 Flow IAT Std – Standard deviation of inter-arrival time between two flows 
 ACK Flag Count – Packets count with ACK 
 Bwd Packet Length Mean – Mean of number of packets sent in a backward direction 
Here is the sample of how the Generator produces an adversarial attack by the proposed 
technique. In this diagram, the darker shade explains the feature values of the features that 
are contributing to the attack. Whereas non highlighted values depict the feature value of a 




  Figure 13: The process to generate adversarial DDoS attack 
This figure explains that to maintain the intensity of the attack, and we need to keep 
that functional attack features static and only change the feature values that are not 
contributing to the attack. So to evade the black-box IDS, the generator changes the values 
of the features that are not contributing to the DDoS attack. 
4.3 Training an IDS with the previously generated adversarial data 
In this section, I will discuss the training of the IDS so that I can evaluate the 
performance of the IDS with the adversarial data. Following is the diagram that depicts the 
training process. 
 
Figure 14: Training the Black-Box IDS 
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I  considered three inputs to train the IDS: normal or benign data, new adversarial data, 
and previously generated adversarial data. The IDS learns about the adversarial data and 
tries to detect the DDoS attack data. Algorithm 2 suggests the overall process for the same. 
Algorithm 2: Training IDS with Adversarial DDoS data 
Input: 
 Generator – N noise + Original Attack Data 
 IDS – Benign or Normal Data, Adversarial Data, and Previously Generated  
           Adversarial Data 
 Critic / Discriminator – Sattack and Sbenign 
Output: 
 Critic / Discriminator, Generator, and trained IDS 
1: for epochs = 1 , … , MAX EPOCHS do  
2:   for G-iterations, do 
3:       Generator creates adversarial network attacks using Sattack 
                        Update loss using PG function 
4:   end loop 
5:   for D-iterations, do 
6:         Critic / Discriminator classifies the network data to 
                          Bbenign and Battack 
7:          Update loss using PD function 
8:     Feed Battack (Adversarial data) and Previously Generated Adversarial   
     Data 
9:   end loop 





4.4 Polymorphic Engine to generate Polymorphic Attack 
This section will discuss different methods to update the feature profile of the attack 
that generates polymorphic adversarial DDoS attacks.  
Three different methods used for the Polymorphic engine are as follows. 
1) Update new features in the attack profile after the IDS detects previous adversarial 
attacks. Algorithm 3 will discuss the process. 
Algorithm 3:  
Input – Use five functional attack features with a high impact score from the shortlisted 
features and five normal features. 
1:  Generate adversarial DDoS data and attack the IDS. 
2:  Train the IDS so that it can detect previously generated adversarial DDoS data.  
3:  Use the same set of features to generate an adversarial DDoS attack. Again, go to                                                                                                 
 step – 2. If the Generator fails to evade the IDS, choose one functional feature with
 a high feature score, one normal or benign feature from the predefined set of 
  features, and swap them with the used features. 
4: Go to step – 1. 
5: In the end, the IDS will detect all the Polymorphic adversarial DDoS attacks; the 
program will stop. 
 
2) Add new features from the predefined list of features in the current attack profile after 
the IDS detects previous adversarial attacks, and the following algorithm will discuss 
the process. 
Algorithm 4:  
Input – Use five functional attack features with a high impact score from the shortlisted 
features and five normal features. 
1: Generate adversarial DDoS data and attack the IDS. 
2: Train the IDS so that it can detect previously generated adversarial DDoS data. 
3: Use the same set of features to generate an adversarial DDoS attack. Again, go to 
step – 2. If the Generator cannot deceive the IDS with the same set of features, choose 
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one new functional feature with a high impact score, one feature that represents benign 
data, and add them to the previous attack profile. 
4: Go to step – 1. 
5: At the end, the IDS will detect all the Polymorphic adversarial DDoS attacks. The 
program will stop. 
 
 
Figure 15: Manual process to generate Polymorphic adversarial attack 
In the above methods, I assumed that an attacker would modify the feature profile 
manually and train the model with the new feature profile every time after the ISD detects 
a polymorphic attack. I considered using only a total of 20 features that were provided by 
the SHAP method. 
3) It will be challenging to keep manually changing the feature profile if we want to use 
more than 20 features. So as an alternative method, I used a Reinforcement Learning 





Figure 16: Function of RL in this framework 
The Reinforcement Learning method is an ML-based technique that focuses on 
retraining the algorithm following a trial-and-error approach. The agent in this architecture 
evaluates the current IDS attack detection score. Then the agent takes action and receives 
feedback from IDS. Positive feedback is a reward, and negative feedback is a penalty to 
the agent. The following algorithm will explain the process. The overall process of 
generating a polymorphic attack is explained in the following algorithm 5. 
 
Figure 17: Automated RL that generates Polymorphic adversarial attack 
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Algorithm 5:  
Input – Use any five features with a high impact score and any 5 with the lowest score 
from the shortlisted features.  
1: Generate adversarial DDoS data and attack the IDS. 
2: Train the IDS and check if the adversarial attack evades the IDS. Continue using 
the current feature set to generate an attack. 
3: Get the attack success rate; if the attack FAILS to evade, The RL algorithm adds 
new features in the existing feature set to generate a polymorphic attack. 
4: If the new polymorphic attack fails to evade the IDS, the RL algorithm will get a 
penalty. The RL will ignore these features, and if the new polymorphic attack evades 
the IDS, the RL will get a reward. 
5: The RL agent will learn combinations of the attack feature profile and generate a 
new polymorphic adversarial DDoS attack. 






Chapter 5. Experiment setup, Results, and Analysis 
5.1 Experiment Setup 
This section describes the libraries and hyper-parameters used in this research. 
5.1.1 Libraries  
The following are the libraries used in the overall program of this research. 
PyTorch [52] 
It is an open-source machine learning platform that is based on the Torch library. I used 
the PyTorch library to create neural networks for Black-box IDS, the Generator, and the 
Discriminator or critic. For example, to generator random noise, I have used a 
torch.Tensor method. 
Scikit-learn [53] 
It is a machine learning library for python that supports various classification, 
regression, and clustering techniques. Examples: sklearn.utils, sklearn.metrics. 
Pandas [54] 
A python library that is used to read, manipulate, and analyze the dataset. For example, 
to read CSV files, we use the read_csv() method from this library. 
Numpy [55] 
It is a library that provides a huge collection of mathematical functions used to format 





A python library is used to plot mathematical graphs. In this research, I used this library 
to plot a detection rate of an IDS, accuracy of a model. 
5.1.2 Hyper-parameters 
Hyper-parameters are essential properties that define the characteristics of the training 
process of the machine learning model. They include a list of variables that explain the 
structure of a neural network. The following table depicts hyper-parameters that are used 
in this research. 
Table 5: Hyper-parameters 
# HYPER-PARAMETER DESCRIPTION 
1 Batch_Size Defines the number of samples to consider for one 
iteration. 
2 learning_rate Controls the weights of a neural network 
3 Critic_Iters Critic_iters for each Generator cycles 
4 Optimizer Methods used to update the attributes of the neural 
networks, e.g., Adam, Rmsprop, Adagrad 
5 Epochs A number of cycles pass through an entire dataset. 
 
Here, Batch_size, epochs, learning_rate, ciritic_iters are optimization hyperparameters 
related to the optimization and training process of the model. In comparison, an optimizer 




5.1.3 Evaluation Metrics 
To evaluate the performance and the results of this work, I used the following 
parameters. 
 Accuracy – represents the fraction of precisely classified data in comparison to the 
total processed data. The formula to calculate accuracy is as follows 
Accuracy = 
  
      
 
 Precision – a ratio between True Positive values and all the positive values received 




 Recall – a ratio between correctly detected samples over total sample data. It is also 





 F1-Score – a calculation of a mean of precision and recall.  
F1-Score = 2 X 
    








5.2 Experiment Scenarios and Results 
This section describes the results of various experiments for different scenarios and 
analyses of findings. 
5.2.1 Adversarial attack generation 
The first step of the research is to generate adversarial DDoS data that can evade the 
Black-box IDS. As seen in the graph initially, the Generator produces data that is unable 
to bypass the IDS. After training the Generator for 100 epochs, it learns to generate 
adversarial data to deceive the IDS. 
 




5.2.2 Training IDS with the Adversarial DDoS data 
The next step is to train the IDS with the previously generated adversarial DDoS data. 
Following is the result of the detection rate of the IDS after training. In the initial cycles, 
the IDS struggles to detect the attacks. After training it for 100 epochs, it detects almost all 
the attacks. 
 
Figure 19: Detection rate after Training the IDS  
 
5.2.3 Polymorphic adversarial DDoS attack generation 
This section illustrates the detection rate of the Black Box IDS under the generation 
of polymorphic adversarial attacks. 
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 In the first experiment, I manually selected new features to produce polymorphic 
attacks. For this test, I used only limited features from the dataset. The following is the 
initial result using algorithm 3. 
 
Figure 20: Polymorphic adversarial DDoS attack using Algorithm 3 
In the above result, a red-colored graph suggests a polymorphic attack being generated 
and proceed towards the BlackBox IDS. As seen, the polymorphic attack can deceive the 
IDS. The green-colored graph depicts the training of the IDS with the previously 
generated polymorphic adversarial DDoS data. After 100 epochs, the IDS detects the 
polymorphic adversarial DDoS attack. The following result indicates all the cycles of 
polymorphic attacks on the IDS. The Generator utilizes the same combination of the 






Figure 21: IDS detection rate for each attack cycle (using algorithm 3) 
Each data point in figure 21 depicts the IDS detection rate. Once the IDS detects all the 
previous versions of the polymorphic DDoS attack that uses the same feature set (as seen 
in figure 21), the generator manually selects new predefined features and generates a new 
polymorphic adversarial DDoS attack. For this test, I used only a group of 10 features. In 
this test, the generator can evade the IDS up to 16 cycles, as seen in the appendix results 
B-1. 
In the next test, I used a technique that follows algorithm 4 to update the feature profile 
of the attack to generate a polymorphic adversarial DDoS attack. For this experiment, I 
began with ten features to generate polymorphic attack data. To generate a new 
 
48 
polymorphic attack, I will add two new features in the existing attack data and used a total 
of 20 features. The following is the first result of the initial polymorphic attack. 
 
Figure 22: Polymorphic adversarial DDoS attack using Algorithm 4 
Each data point in figure 23 depicts the IDS detection rate. Once the IDS detects all the 
previous versions of the polymorphic DDoS attack that uses the same feature set, the 
generator manually selects new predefined features and generates a new polymorphic 
adversarial DDoS attack. For this test, I have used a group of 20 features. In this test, the 




Figure 23: IDS detection rate for each attack cycle (using algorithm 4) 
The first two experiments focus on testing if the Generator can produce polymorphic 
adversarial DDoS attack data by updating the feature profile manually. After confirming 
the possibility of doing so, the next step is to automatically select features and manipulate 
the attack feature profile to generate polymorphic adversarial attack data. 
To automate this task, I applied the Reinforcement Learning technique. It receives an 
IDS detection rate and learns to select new features and add them to the old feature set and 
create a new feature set. This experiment also indicates the number of times a generator 
can produce polymorphic adversarial DDoS data. To examine this, I used four sets of 
feature combinations for each test to generate the automated Polymorphic adversarial 
DDoS attack. 
 The first test includes a total of 40 features from the dataset 
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 The second test includes a total of 50 features from the dataset 
 The third test includes a total of 60 features from the dataset 
 The fourth test includes a total of 76 features from the dataset 
The above experiments begin with ten features, from which 5 are a functional feature 
with a high impact score, and 5 are usual or benign. 
The results of the above tests can be seen in Appendix B. 
5.2.4 Test Evaluation 
In this section, I have stated the overall values for the Precision, Recall, and F1-score 
for each test.  
Table 6: Model Evaluation 
# TEST ACCURACY PRECISION  RECALL F1-
SCORE 
1 Manual Test – 1 (using 
Algorithm 3) 
98.58 96.24 92.91 0.953 
2 Manual Test – 2 (using 
Algorithm 4) 
98.08 95.22 92.15 0.946 
3 Automated Test using 40 
features 
(using Algorithm 5) 
98.27 94.41 92.44 0.935 
4 Automated Test using 
50 features 
(using Algorithm 5) 
96.97 93.58 91.69 0.928 
5 Automated Test using 60 
features 
(using Algorithm 5) 
96.34 93.22 91.43 0.921 
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6 Automated Test using 76 
features 
(using Algorithm 5) 
94.42 91.79 91.58 0.916 
 
5.3 Analysis 
As mentioned earlier, I ran 6 test scenarios with different feature combinations. 2 
experiments consist of a manual feature selection technique to generate polymorphic 
adversarial DDoS attack data and four tests with an Automated feature selection technique.  
I utilized a manual feature selection technique as a benchmark and compared this 
technique to the automated feature selection technique to analyze for how many cycles the 
polymorphic attack evades the Black-Box IDS. 
The following graphs will be useful to compare these six different scenarios. 
 




Figure 25: Test - 2 Polymorphic Adversarial attacks using Manual feature selection 
 




Figure 27: Test - 4 Polymorphic Adversarial attacks using Automated feature selection 
 




Figure 29: Test - 6 Polymorphic Adversarial attacks using Automated feature selection 
In all the above results, the Polymorphic DDoS adversarial attack successfully evading 
the IDS; the orange bar suggests the polymorphic attack is becoming weak once the IDS 
detects them. By counting the red bar, we can see how many times the Generator produced 
a polymorphic attack in each cycle. 
Figures 25,26 suggest that when the Generator uses a small number of features, more 
than 90% of the polymorphic attack evades the IDS. By noticing these figures, it is clear 
that using fewer features to generate a polymorphic attack has a higher evasion rate but 
fewer chances of generating more polymorphic attacks. 
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Figures 27,28,29,30 suggest that initially, more than 90% of the polymorphic attacks 
can evade the IDS. However, results propose that if the Generator utilizes more features to 
generate a polymorphic DDoS attack, the success rate gets lower each time. 
Comparing all the results confirms that while using a fewer number of features to 
generate polymorphic adversarial DDoS attacks, the attack success rate stays up to the 
acceptable amount. However, when we use more features, the attack success rate depletes 
after certain cycles. 
Now the following table describes the total runtime for each experiment. 
Table 7: Total runtime of each test 
# TEST TOTAL RUNTIME 
1 Test – 1 Manual Feature profile update (with a total 
of 10 features) 
30.43 minutes 
2 Test – 2 Manual Feature profile update (with a total 
of 20 features) 
46.21 minutes 
3 Test – 3 Automated Feature profile update (with a 
total of 40 features) 
75.31 minutes 
4 Test – 5 Automated Feature profile update (with a 
total of 50 features) 
90.45 minutes 
5 Test – 6 Automated Feature profile update (with a 
total of 60 features) 
145.37 minutes 
6 Test – 5 Automated Feature profile update (with a 





As observed from the above table, if the test uses a small number of features, it takes 
less time to run the simulation. The run time rises upon increasing features to generate a 




Chapter 6. Conclusions and Future work 
With this work, I proposed a framework to generate polymorphic adversarial DDoS 
attacks using a CICIDS2017 dataset using a Wasserstein GAN. To generate polymorphic 
attacks, I proposed three different techniques that change the feature profile of the attack. 
In the first two techniques, I have selected new features manually each time to generate 
polymorphic adversarial attacks. Furthermore, to automate the feature selection to generate 
polymorphic attacks, I applied a Reinforcement Learning technique in each technique; the 
Generator creates a polymorphic attack until no more new features are remaining to choose 
from the feature set.  
From the results, I have demonstrated that the Generator can produce polymorphic 
adversarial DDoS. Results also depict that while using a small number of features to create 
a polymorphic attack, the attacks were successfully deceiving the IDS with more than a 
90% success rate while using a manual selection of features. However, when I utilized 
more than 40 features to generate polymorphic attacks, the evasion rate went down, and 
only 70% of attacks deceived the IDS at the end. One more thing I have noticed in this 
research is that using more sets of features takes more time to generate polymorphic 
adversarial DDoS attacks.  
In the future, it could be interesting to consider using other variants of GAN like 
DCGAN [57], Conditional GAN [58], BiGAN [59], Cycle GAN [60] to generate 
adversarial network attack data and evaluate the detection systems. Another limitation of 
this research is that it focused on generating only one type of attack, as every attack has 
different functional features. It would be difficult to use one Generator to create other types 
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of attacks with the same generator. So it would be interesting to use multiple generators for 
each type of attack and evaluate the performance of the IDS against all types of 
polymorphic adversarial network attacks.  
The focus of this research is only to generate polymorphic attacks using a GAN that 
can deceive the IDS. In the future, it would be interesting to use a similar methodology for 
the detection system and see the overall result of how a Black Box IDS responds to an 
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Appendix A. (Feature Description of CICIDS2017) 
Table 8: Detailed description of features 
# Feature  Description 
1 Flow Duration Duration of the Flow in milliseconds 
2 Total Fwd Packets Total packet flow in a forward direction 
3 Total Bwd Packets Total packet flow in a backward direction 
4 Total len of Fwd 
Packet 
Total length of the packet in a forward 
direction 
5 Total len of Bwd 
Packet 
Total length of the packet in a backward 
direction 
6 Fwd Packet Length 
Max 
Max length of the packet in a forward 
direction 
7 Fwd Packet Length 
Min 
Min length of the packet in a forward 
direction 
8 Fwd Packet Length 
Mean 
Mean of packet length in a forward direction 
9 Fwd Packet Length Std The standard deviation of packet length in a 
forward direction 
10 Bwd Packet Length 
Max 
Max length of the packet in a backward 
direction 
11 Bwd Packet Length 
Min 




12 Bwd Packet Length 
Mean 
Mean of packet length in a backward 
direction 
13 Bwd Packet Length Std The standard deviation of packet length in a 
backward direction 
14 Flow Bytes/s Number of bytes flow per second 
15 Flow Packets/s Number of packet flows per second 
16 Flow IAT Mean Mean of Inter-arrival Time between two flow 
17 Flow IAT Std The standard deviation of inter-arrival time 
between two flow 
18 Flow IAT Max Max inter-arrival time between two flow 
19 Flow IAT Min Min inter-arrival time between two flow 
20 Fwd IAT Total Total inter-arrival time between 2 packets in 
a forward direction 
21 Fwd IAT Mean Mean of inter-arrival time between 2 packets 
in a forward direction 
22 Fwd IAT Std The standard deviation of inter-arrival time 
between two packets in a forward direction 
23 Fwd IAT Max Max inter-arrival time between 2 packets in a 
forward direction 
24 Fwd IAT Min Min inter-arrival time between 2 packets in a 
forward direction 
25 Bwd IAT Total Total inter-arrival time between 2 packets in 
a backward direction 
26 Bwd IAT Mean Mean of inter-arrival time between 2 packets 
in a backward direction 
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27 Bwd IAT Std The standard deviation of inter-arrival time 
between 2 packets in a backward direction 
28 Bwd IAT Max Max inter-arrival time between 2 packets in a 
backward direction 
29 Bwd IAT Min Min inter-arrival time between 2 packets in a 
backward direction 
30 Fwd PSH Flags No of PSH Flags set in packets in a forward 
direction 
31 Bwd PSH Flags No of PSH Flags set in packets in  a backward 
direction 
32 Fwd URG Flags No of URG Flags set in packets in a forward 
direction 
33 Bwd URG Flags No of URG Flags set in packets in a backward 
direction 
34 Fwd Header Length Byte length of a header sent in a forward 
direction 
35 Bwd Header Length Byte length of a header sent in a backward 
direction 
36 Fwd Packets/s Packet length sent in forward direction per 
second 
37 Bwd Packets/s Packet length sent in backward direction per 
second 
38 Min Packet Length Min packet length in a flow 
39 Max Packet Length Max packet length in a flow 
40 Packet Length Mean Average packet length per-flow 
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41 Packet Length Std The standard deviation of packet length per-
flow 
42 Packet Len. Variance Arrival time of the packet 
43 FIN Flag Count Packets with a FIN flag 
44 SYN Flag Count Packets with SYN flag 
45 RST Flag Count Packets with RST flag 
46 PSH Flag Count Packets with PSH flag 
47 ACK Flag Count Packets with ACK flag 
48 URG Flag Count Packets with URG flag 
49 CWE Flag Count Packets with CWE flag 
50 ECE Flag Count Packets with ECE flag 
51 Down/Up Ratio The ratio of download and upload 
52 Average Packet Size The average size of a packet 
53 Avg Fwd Segment Size Average of segment size in a forward 
direction 
54 Avg Bwd Segment 
Size 
Average of segment size in a backward 
direction 
55 Fwd Avg Bytes/Bulk Bytes/Bulk average sent in a forward 
direction 
56 Fwd Avg Packets/Bulk Packets/Bulk average sent in a forward 
direction 
57 Fwd Avg Bulk Rate Bulk rate average in a forward direction 




59 Bwd Avg Packets/Bulk Packets/Bulk average sent in a backward 
direction 
60 Bwd Avg Bulk Rate Bulk rate average in a backward direction 
61 Subflow Fwd Packets No of packets in each sub-flow sent in a 
forward direction 
62 Subflow Fwd Bytes No of bytes in each sub-flow sent in a forward 
direction 
63 Subflow Bwd Packets No of packets in each sub-flow sent in a 
backward direction 
64 Subflow Bwd Bytes No of bytes in each sub-flow sent in a 
backward direction 
65 Init_Win_bytes_fwd Bytes sent at an initial window in a forward 
direction 
66 Act_data_pkt_fwd No of packets sent with min 1 byte in a 
forward direction 
67 Min_seg_size_fwd Min segment size sent in a forward direction 
68 Active Mean Active mean time of an active flow before 
becoming idle 
69 Active Std Standard deviation Active of an active flow 
before becoming idle 
70 Active Max Max time of an active flow before becoming 
idle 




72 Idle Mean Mean time of idle flow before becoming 
active 
73 Idle Packet Mean time of idle packet before becoming 
active 
74 Idle Std Standard deviation time of idle flow before 
becoming active 
75 Idle Max Max time of an idle flow before becoming 
active 
76 Idle Min Min time of an idle flow before becoming 
active 






Appendix B. (Result of Polymorphic Attack on IDS using GAN) 
B.1 Overall results of a manual polymorphic attack – 1 
 





B.2 Overall results of a manual polymorphic attack – 2 
 




B.3 Automated Polymorphic DDoS Attack with 40 features 
  Table 9: Attack results with a total of 40 features 
Cycles  IDS Detection Rate (%) 
1 – Attack 2.33 
1 – Training IDS 99.45 
2 – Attack 45.24 
2 – Training IDS 99.32 
3 – Attack 77.42 
3 – Training IDS 99.35 
4 – Attack 90.13 
4 – Training IDS 99.52 
5 – Attack  3.23 
5 – Training IDS 99.73 
6 – Attack 69.12 
6 – Training IDS 99.31 
7 – Attack 91.32 
7 – Training IDS 99.37 
8 – Attack  3.45 
8 – Training IDS 99.09 
9 – Attack 57.43 
9 – Training IDS 99.39 
 
73 
10 – Attack 89.14 
10 – Training IDS 99.13 
11 – Attack  4.19 
11 – Training IDS 99.14 
12 – Attack 46.23 
12 – Training IDS 99.67 
13 – Attack 90.51 
13 – Training IDS 99.14 
14 – Attack  4.55 
14 – Training IDS 99.24 
15 – Attack 45.23 
15 – Training IDS 99.54 
16 – Attack  74.19 
16 – Training IDS 99.27 
17 – Attack 88.17 
17 – Training IDS 99.35 
18 – Attack  3.57 
18 – Training IDS 99.07 
19 – Attack 63.21 
19 – Training IDS 99.22 
20 – Attack 90.62 
20 – Training IDS 99.24 
 
74 
21 – Attack  3.49 
21 – Training IDS 99.58 
22 – Attack 61.18 
22 – Training IDS 99.35 
23 – Attack 86.63 
23 – Training IDS 99.74 
24 – Attack  3.56 
24 – Training IDS 99.03 
25 – Attack 42.14 
25 – Training IDS 99.24 
26 – Attack 71.87 
26 – Training IDS 99.29 
27 – Attack 91.71 
27 – Training IDS 99.08 
28 – Attack  4.74 
28 – Training IDS 99.21 
29 – Attack 34.32 
29 – Training IDS 99.61 
30 – Attack 66.40 
30 – Training IDS 99.38 
31 – Attack 87.96 
31 – Training IDS 99.05 
 
75 
32 – Attack  4.41 
32 – Training IDS 99.15 
33 – Attack 26.88 
33 – Training IDS 99.01 
34 – Attack 57.19 
34 – Training IDS 99.06 
35 – Attack 85.14 
35 – Training IDS 99.29 
36 – Attack  6.86 
36 – Training IDS 99.46 
37 – Attack 37.36 
37 – Training IDS 99.04 
38 – Attack 62.26 
38 – Training IDS 99.19 
39 – Attack 84.37 
39 – Training IDS 99.22 
40 – Attack  8.16 
40 – Training IDS 99.36 
41 – Attack 53.19 
41 – Training IDS 99.48 
42 – Attack 89.45 
42 – Training IDS 99.56 
 
76 
43 – Attack  8.28 
43 – Training IDS 99.30 
44 – Attack 66.40 
44 – Training IDS 99.35 
45 – Attack 88.16 
45 – Training IDS 99.02 
46 – Attack  10.57 
46 – Training IDS 99.31 
47 – Attack 59.23 
47 – Training IDS 99.26 
48 – Attack 87.79 
48 – Training IDS 99.14 
49 – Attack  9.22 
49 – Training IDS 99.09 
50 – Attack 45.20 
50 – Training IDS 99.26 
51 – Attack 65.18 
51 – Training IDS 99.24 
52 – Attack 87.79 
52 – Training IDS 99.13 
53 – Attack  10.23 
53 – Training IDS 99.77 
 
77 
54 – Attack 69.32 
54 – Training IDS 99.18 
55 – Attack 88.21 
55 – Training IDS 99.45 
56 – Attack  10.75 
56 – Training IDS 99.16 
57 – Attack 55.73 
57 – Training IDS 99.14 
58 – Attack 84.70 
58 – Training IDS 99.24 
59 – Attack  11.05 
59 – Training IDS 99.57 
60 – Attack 88.37 
60 – Training IDS 98.73 
61 – Attack  11.20 
61 – Training IDS 98.86 
62 – Attack 41.18 
62 – Training IDS 98.91 
63 – Attack 91.11 




In all the results, the red-colored columns suggest that the generator is producing 
polymorphic adversarial DDoS attacks, and green-colored columns depict that the IDS 
detects the polymorphic attacks. As seen in the results, the RL algorithm can launch 19 
different feature profiles to generate polymorphic DDoS attack data. This experiment 
indicates that the polymorphic attacks evade the IDS for 63 cycles. 
B.4 Automated Polymorphic DDoS Attack with 50 features 
  Table 10: Attack results with a total of 50 features 
Cycles  IDS Detection Rate (%) 
1 – Attack 2.33 
1 – Training IDS 99.12 
2 – Attack 55.24 
2 – Training IDS 99.32 
3 – Attack 91.33 
3 – Training IDS 99.52 
4 – Attack  3.53 
4 – Training IDS 99.23 
5 – Attack 59.12 
5 – Training IDS 99.31 
6 – Attack 90.57 
6 – Training IDS 99.37 
7 – Attack  3.59 
 
79 
7 – Training IDS 99.09 
8 – Attack 42.73 
8 – Training IDS 99.39 
9 – Attack 89.14 
9 – Training IDS 99.13 
10 – Attack  4.19 
10 – Training IDS 99.14 
11 – Attack 46.23 
11 – Training IDS 99.67 
12 – Attack 90.51 
12 – Training IDS 99.14 
13 – Attack  4.55 
13 – Training IDS 99.24 
14 – Attack 45.23 
14 – Training IDS 99.54 
15 – Attack  74.19 
15 – Training IDS 99.27 
16 – Attack 88.17 
16 – Training IDS 99.35 
17 – Attack  3.97 
17 – Training IDS 99.07 
18 – Attack 66.21 
 
80 
18 – Training IDS 99.22 
19 – Attack 90.62 
19 – Training IDS 99.24 
20 – Attack  4.66 
20 – Training IDS 99.58 
21 – Attack 63.18 
21 – Training IDS 99.35 
22 – Attack 88.37 
22 – Training IDS 99.74 
23 – Attack  4.56 
23 – Training IDS 99.03 
24 – Attack 57.14 
24 – Training IDS 99.24 
25 – Attack 75.87 
25 – Training IDS 99.29 
26 – Attack 90.71 
26 – Training IDS 99.08 
27 – Attack  4.74 
27 – Training IDS 99.21 
28 – Attack 34.32 
28 – Training IDS 99.61 
29 – Attack 66.40 
 
81 
29 – Training IDS 99.38 
30 – Attack 87.96 
30 – Training IDS 99.05 
31 – Attack  3.41 
31 – Training IDS 99.15 
32 – Attack 57.19 
32 – Training IDS 99.06 
33 – Attack 85.14 
33 – Training IDS 99.29 
34 – Attack  6.86 
34 – Training IDS 99.46 
35 – Attack 37.36 
35 – Training IDS 99.04 
36 – Attack 62.26 
36 – Training IDS 99.19 
37 – Attack 84.37 
37 – Training IDS 99.22 
38 – Attack  8.16 
38 – Training IDS 99.36 
39 – Attack 53.19 
39 – Training IDS 99.48 
40 – Attack 89.45 
 
82 
40 – Training IDS 99.56 
41 – Attack  8.28 
41 – Training IDS 99.30 
42 – Attack 66.40 
42 – Training IDS 99.35 
43 – Attack 88.16 
43 – Training IDS 99.02 
44 – Attack  9.57 
44 – Training IDS 99.31 
45 – Attack 59.23 
45 – Training IDS 99.26 
46 – Attack 87.79 
46 – Training IDS 99.14 
47 – Attack  9.22 
47 – Training IDS 99.09 
48 – Attack 45.20 
48 – Training IDS 99.26 
49 – Attack 87.79 
49 – Training IDS 99.13 
50 – Attack  10.23 
50 – Training IDS 99.77 
51 – Attack 69.32 
 
83 
51 – Training IDS 99.18 
52 – Attack 88.21 
52 – Training IDS 99.45 
53 – Attack  10.75 
53 – Training IDS 99.16 
54 – Attack 55.73 
54 – Training IDS 99.14 
55 – Attack 84.70 
55 – Training IDS 99.24 
56 – Attack  11.05 
56 – Training IDS 99.57 
57 – Attack 52.53 
57 – Training IDS 99.73 
58 – Attack 88.37 
58 – Training IDS 98.73 
59 – Attack  11.20 
59 – Training IDS 98.86 
60 – Attack 41.18 
60 – Training IDS 98.91 
61 – Attack 91.11 
61 – Training IDS 98.97 
62 – Attack  12.20 
 
84 
62 – Training IDS 99.26 
63 – Attack 61.25 
63 – Training IDS 98.97 
64 – Attack 90.32 
64 – Training IDS 99.17 
65 – Attack 13.65 
65 – Training IDS 98.97 
66 – Attack 60.87 
66 – Training IDS 99.47 
67 – Attack 92.41 
67 – Training IDS 98.97 
68 – Attack 15.53 
68 – Training IDS 98.97 
69 – Attack 52.55 
69 – Training IDS 98.97 
70 – Attack 90.42 
70 – Training IDS 98.97 
71 – Attack 16.41 
71 – Training IDS 98.97 
72 – Attack 61.88 
72 – Training IDS 98.97 
73 – Attack 89.36 
 
85 
73 – Training IDS 98.97 
 
As seen in the results, the RL algorithm can launch 23 different feature profiles to 
generate polymorphic DDoS attack data. This experiment indicates that the polymorphic 
attacks evade the IDS for 73 cycles. 
B.5 Automated Polymorphic DDoS Attack with 60 features 
  Table 11: Attack results with a total of 60 features 
Cycles  IDS Detection Rate (%) 
1 – Attack 2.55 
1 – Training IDS 99.12 
2 – Attack 52.64 
2 – Training IDS 99.32 
3 – Attack 91.33 
3 – Training IDS 99.52 
4 – Attack  3.53 
4 – Training IDS 99.23 
5 – Attack 59.12 
5 – Training IDS 99.31 
6 – Attack 92.12 
6 – Training IDS 99.37 
7 – Attack  3.59 
 
86 
7 – Training IDS 99.09 
8 – Attack 42.73 
8 – Training IDS 99.39 
9 – Attack 89.14 
9 – Training IDS 99.13 
10 – Attack  4.19 
10 – Training IDS 99.14 
11 – Attack 46.23 
11 – Training IDS 99.67 
12 – Attack 90.51 
12 – Training IDS 99.14 
13 – Attack  4.86 
13 – Training IDS 99.24 
14 – Attack 45.23 
14 – Training IDS 99.54 
15 – Attack  74.19 
15 – Training IDS 99.27 
16 – Attack 88.17 
16 – Training IDS 99.35 
17 – Attack  4.23 
17 – Training IDS 99.07 
18 – Attack 66.21 
 
87 
18 – Training IDS 99.22 
20 – Attack 90.62 
20 – Training IDS 99.24 
21 – Attack  4.66 
21 – Training IDS 99.58 
22 – Attack 64.18 
22 – Training IDS 99.35 
23 – Attack 87.37 
23 – Training IDS 99.74 
24 – Attack  4.56 
24 – Training IDS 99.03 
25 – Attack 47.14 
25 – Training IDS 99.24 
26 – Attack 71.87 
26 – Training IDS 99.29 
27 – Attack 91.71 
27 – Training IDS 99.08 
28 – Attack  3.88 
28 – Training IDS 99.21 
29 – Attack 34.32 
29 – Training IDS 99.61 
30 – Attack 66.40 
 
88 
30 – Training IDS 99.38 
31 – Attack 87.96 
31 – Training IDS 99.05 
32 – Attack  4.53 
32 – Training IDS 99.15 
33 – Attack 46.54 
33 – Training IDS 99.01 
34 – Attack 88.47 
34 – Training IDS 99.29 
35 – Attack  6.86 
35 – Training IDS 99.46 
36 – Attack 37.36 
36 – Training IDS 99.04 
37 – Attack 62.26 
37 – Training IDS 99.19 
38 – Attack 84.37 
38 – Training IDS 99.22 
39 – Attack  8.16 
39 – Training IDS 99.36 
40 – Attack 53.19 
40 – Training IDS 99.48 
41 – Attack 89.45 
 
89 
41 – Training IDS 99.56 
42 – Attack  8.28 
42 – Training IDS 99.30 
43 – Attack 66.40 
43 – Training IDS 99.35 
44 – Attack 88.16 
44 – Training IDS 99.02 
45 – Attack  10.57 
45 – Training IDS 99.31 
46 – Attack 59.23 
46 – Training IDS 99.26 
47 – Attack 87.79 
47 – Training IDS 99.14 
48 – Attack  9.43 
48 – Training IDS 99.09 
49 – Attack 45.20 
49 – Training IDS 99.26 
50 – Attack 65.18 
50 – Training IDS 99.24 
51 – Attack 87.79 
51 – Training IDS 99.13 
52 – Attack  10.23 
 
90 
52 – Training IDS 99.77 
53 – Attack 69.32 
53 – Training IDS 99.18 
54 – Attack 88.21 
54 – Training IDS 99.45 
55 – Attack  10.75 
55 – Training IDS 99.16 
56 – Attack 55.73 
56 – Training IDS 99.14 
57 – Attack 84.70 
57 – Training IDS 99.24 
58 – Attack  11.05 
58 – Training IDS 99.57 
59 – Attack 65.81 
59 – Training IDS 99.05 
60 – Attack  88.37 
60 – Training IDS 98.73 
61 – Attack  11.20 
61 – Training IDS 98.86 
62 – Attack 41.18 
62 – Training IDS 98.91 
63 – Attack 91.11 
 
91 
63 – Training IDS 99.08 
64 – Attack 12.64 
64 – Training IDS 99.18 
65 – Attack 53.69 
65 – Training IDS 99.12 
66 – Attack 91.59 
66 – Training IDS 98.96 
67 – Attack 14.52 
67 – Training IDS 99.12 
68 – Attack 55.93 
68 – Training IDS 99.38 
69 – Attack 88.65 
69 – Training IDS 99.29 
70 – Attack 16.82 
70 – Training IDS 98.97 
71 – Attack 59.49 
71 – Training IDS 99.17 
72 – Attack 88.27 
72 – Training IDS 99.09 
73 – Attack 18.48 
73 – Training IDS 99.45 
74 – Attack 48.17 
 
92 
74 – Training IDS 99.38 
75 – Attack 87.31 
75 – Training IDS 98.94 
76 – Attack 19.87 
76 – Training IDS 99.38 
77 – Attack 68.77 
77 – Training IDS 98.97 
78 – Attack 92.02 
78 – Training IDS 98.97 
79 – Attack 19.28 
79 – Training IDS 98.97 
80 – Attack 64.21 
80 – Training IDS 99.02 
81 – Attack 91.11 
81 – Training IDS 99.24 
 
As seen in the results, the RL algorithm can launch 25 different feature profiles to 
generate polymorphic DDoS attack data. This experiment indicates that the polymorphic 




B.6 Automated Polymorphic DDoS Attack with 76 features 
  Table 12: Attack results with a total of 76 features 
No of Cycles  IDS Detection Rate (%) 
1 – Attack  2.57 
1 – Training IDS 99.54 
2 – Attack 43.65 
2 – Training IDS 99.23 
3 – Attack 72.72 
3 – Training IDS 99.35 
4 – Attack 89.43 
4 – Training IDS 99.52 
5 – Attack  3.77 
5 – Training IDS 99.13 
6 – Attack 65.21 
6 – Training IDS 99.11 
7 – Attack 88.66 
7 – Training IDS 99.37 
8 – Attack  3.65 
8 – Training IDS 99.49 
9 – Attack 62.63 
9 – Training IDS 99.22 
 
94 
10 – Attack 91.34 
10 – Training IDS 99.13 
11 – Attack  5.02 
11 – Training IDS 99.41 
12 – Attack 46.23 
12 – Training IDS 99.67 
13 – Attack 90.51 
13 – Training IDS 99.14 
14 – Attack  4.55 
14 – Training IDS 99.24 
15 – Attack 45.23 
15 – Training IDS 99.54 
16 – Attack 74.19 
16 – Training IDS 99.27 
17 – Attack 88.17 
17 – Training IDS 99.35 
18 – Attack  3.57 
18 – Training IDS 99.07 
19 – Attack 63.21 
19 – Training IDS 99.22 
20 – Attack 90.62 
20 – Training IDS 99.24 
 
95 
21 – Attack  3.49 
21 – Training IDS 99.58 
22 – Attack 61.18 
22 – Training IDS 99.35 
23 – Attack 86.63 
23 – Training IDS 99.74 
24 – Attack  3.56 
24 – Training IDS 99.03 
25 – Attack 42.14 
25 – Training IDS 99.24 
26 – Attack 71.87 
26 – Training IDS 99.29 
27 – Attack 91.71 
28 – Training IDS 99.08 
29 – Attack  3.74 
29 – Training IDS 99.21 
30 – Attack 34.32 
30 – Training IDS 99.61 
31 – Attack 66.40 
31 – Training IDS 99.38 
32 – Attack 87.96 
32 – Training IDS 99.05 
 
96 
33 – Attack  3.55 
33 – Training IDS 99.15 
34 – Attack 26.88 
34 – Training IDS 99.01 
35 – Attack 57.19 
35 – Training IDS 99.06 
36 – Attack 85.14 
36 – Training IDS 99.29 
37 – Attack  5.86 
37 – Training IDS 99.46 
38 – Attack 37.36 
38 – Training IDS 99.04 
39 – Attack 62.26 
39 – Training IDS 99.19 
40 – Attack 84.37 
40 – Training IDS 99.22 
41 – Attack  6.16 
41 – Training IDS 99.36 
42 – Attack 53.19 
42 – Training IDS 99.48 
43 – Attack 89.45 
43 – Training IDS 99.56 
 
97 
44 – Attack  7.98 
44 – Training IDS 99.30 
45 – Attack 66.40 
45 – Training IDS 99.35 
46 – Attack 88.16 
46 – Training IDS 99.02 
47 – Attack  10.11 
47 – Training IDS 99.31 
48 – Attack 59.23 
48 – Training IDS 99.26 
49 – Attack 87.79 
49 – Training IDS 99.14 
50 – Attack  10.22 
50 – Training IDS 99.09 
51 – Attack 45.20 
51 – Training IDS 99.26 
52 – Attack 65.18 
52 – Training IDS 99.24 
53 – Attack 87.79 
53 – Training IDS 99.13 
54 – Attack  10.55 
54 – Training IDS 99.77 
 
98 
55 – Attack 69.32 
55 – Training IDS 99.18 
56 – Attack 88.21 
56 – Training IDS 99.45 
57 – Attack  10.75 
57 – Training IDS 99.16 
58 – Attack 55.73 
58 – Training IDS 99.14 
59 – Attack 84.70 
59 – Training IDS 99.24 
60 – Attack  11.05 
60 – Training IDS 99.57 
61 – Attack 88.37 
61 – Training IDS 98.73 
62 – Attack  11.20  
62 – Training IDS 98.86 
63 – Attack 41.18 
63 – Training IDS 98.91 
64 – Attack 91.11 
64 – Training IDS 98.97 
65 – Attack  11.12 
65 – Training IDS 98.67 
 
99 
66 – Attack  54.78 
66 – Training IDS 99.39 
67 – Attack 82.31 
67 – Training IDS 99.24 
68 – Attack  11.50 
68 – Training IDS 99.13 
69 – Attack 45.24 
69 – Training IDS 99.18 
70 – Attack 83.82 
70 – Training IDS 99.45 
71 – Attack  12.12 
71 – Training IDS 99.51 
72 – Attack  41.05 
72 – Training IDS 99.16 
73 – Attack  70.35 
73 – Training IDS 99.14 
74 – Attack  90.55 
74 – Training IDS 99.57 
75 – Attack 11.35 
75 – Training IDS 99.77 
76 – Attack  77.66 
76 – Training IDS 99.10 
 
100 
77 – Attack  89.85 
77 – Training IDS 99.24 
78 – Attack 12.13 
78 – Training IDS 99.18 
79 – Attack 43.61 
79 – Training IDS 99.14 
80 – Attack 90.62 
80 – Training IDS 99.53 
81 – Attack 13.34 
81 – Training IDS 99.62 
82 – Attack  74.59 
82 – Training IDS 99.26 
83 – Attack  90.19 
83 – Training IDS 99.41 
84 – Attack 15.22 
84 – Training IDS 99.26 
85 – Attack  89.38 
85 – Training IDS 99.21 
86 – Attack 16.22 
86 – Training IDS 99.23 
87 – Attack  88.59 
87 – Training IDS 99.18 
 
101 
88 – Attack 18.59 
88 – Training IDS 99.08 
89 – Attack  90.43 
89 – Training IDS 99.06 
90 – Attack 19.43 
90 – Training IDS 99.02 
91 – Attack  63.67 
91 – Training IDS 99.15 
92 – Attack  90.43 
92 – Training IDS 99.45 
93 – Attack 21.35 
93 – Training IDS 99.47 
94 – Attack  84.55 
94 – Training IDS 99.26 
95 – Attack 23.48 
95 – Training IDS 99.56 
96 – Attack  87.12 
96 – Training IDS 99.51 
97 – Attack 27.64 
97 – Training IDS 99.61 
98 – Attack  90.12 
98 – Training IDS 99.26 
 
102 
99 – Attack  92.12 
99 – Training IDS 99.36 
 
As seen in the results, the RL algorithm can launch 32 different feature profiles to 
generate polymorphic DDoS attack data. This experiment indicates that the polymorphic 




Appendix C. (Source Code) 
C.1 Feature Selection using SHAP 
import catboost 
from catboost import CatBoostRegressor 
import shap 
import numpy as np 
import pandas as pd 
 
dataset = pd.read_csv('DDoS.csv', low_memory = False) 
array = dataset.values 
X = array[:, :-1] 
Y = array[:, -1] 
 
model = CatBoostRegressor(iterations=500, learning_rate=0.01, random_seed=123) 
model.fit(X, Y, verbose=False, plot=False) 
 
explainer = shap.TreeExplainer(model) 
shap_values = explainer.shap_values(X) 
 
shap.summary_plot(shap_values, X, dataset.columns, plot_type="bar") 






C.2 The Generator, The Discriminator, Black-Box IDS 
import torch as th 
from torch import nn 
from torch.autograd import Variable as V 
import numpy as np 
import torch 
device = torch.device("cuda:0" if torch.cuda.is_available() else "cpu") 
 
# Model for the IDS 
class BlackboxIDS(nn.Module): 
    def __init__(self,input_dim, output_dim): 
        super().__init__() 
        self.layer = nn.Sequential( 
            nn.Linear(input_dim, 64), 
            nn.Dropout(0.6),    
            nn.LeakyReLU(True), 
            nn.Linear(64, 32), 
            nn.Dropout(0.5),                    
            nn.LeakyReLU(True),   
            nn.Linear(32, output_dim), 
            nn.Dropout(0.5),                   
            nn.LeakyReLU(True),                             
        ).to(device) 
        self.output = nn.Sigmoid().to(device) 
    def forward(self,x): 
        x = self.layer(x) 
        return x 
 
# Model for the Discriminator 
class Discriminator(nn.Module): 
    def __init__(self,input_dim, output_dim): 
        super(Discriminator, self).__init__() 
        self.layer = nn.Sequential( 
            nn.Linear(input_dim, 64), 
            nn.LeakyReLU(True),           
            nn.Linear(64 , 32), 
            nn.LeakyReLU(True), 
            nn.Linear(32, output_dim)             
        ).to(device) 
    def forward(self,x): 
        return self.layer(x) 
 
# GAN - Produce Adversarial Attack  
class Generator(nn.Module):  
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 def __init__(self,input_dim, output_dim): 
         super(Generator, self).__init__() 
       self.layer = nn.Sequential( 
             nn.Linear(input_dim, 128), 
             nn.ReLU(True), 
             nn.Linear(128, 64), 
             nn.ReLU(True), 
             nn.Linear(64, 32), 
             nn.ReLU(True), 
             nn.Linear(32, output_dim), 
             nn.ReLU(True), 
             nn.Tanh() 
         ).to(device) 
    def forward(self, noise_dim, raw_attack, attack_category, POS_NONFUNCTIONAL_F
EATURES): 
        ''' 
        Generate Aversarial Attack Traffic while keeping functional features stat
ic 
        ''' 
        if attack_category != 'DDoS': 
            raise ValueError("Preprocess Data Fail: Invalid Attack Category") 
        batch_size = len(raw_attack) 
        pos_nonfunctional_feature = POS_NONFUNCTIONAL_FEATURES[attack_category] 
        noise = V(th.Tensor(np.random.uniform(0,1,(batch_size, noise_dim)))).to(d
evice) 
        generator_out = self.layer(noise) 
        # Keep the functional features 
        adversarial_attack = raw_attack.clone().type(torch.FloatTensor).to(device
) 
        for idx in range(batch_size): 
            adversarial_attack[idx][pos_nonfunctional_feature] = generator_out[id
x] 





import numpy as np 
import pandas as pd 
import torch as th 
from torch.autograd import Variable as V 
import torch.autograd as autograd 
import torch.nn as nn 
import torch.nn.functional as F 
import torch.optim as optim 
from sklearn.utils import shuffle 
from sklearn.metrics import confusion_matrix 
import pickle 
 
from keras.models import load_model 
 
from models import * 
from constants import * 
 
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt 
import math 
import os 
from datetime import date 
import timeit 
 
Dataset_Path = base_path + "Dataset/" 
SavedModelPath = base_path + "Saved Model/" 
Trainsets_Path = Dataset_Path + 'Trainset/' 
g_trainset_path = Trainsets_Path + "WGAN_G.csv" 
d_trainset_path = Trainsets_Path + "WGAN_D.csv" 
testset_path = Dataset_Path + "Testset/" + "DDoS.csv" 
 
GAN_Model_Path = SavedModelPath + 'WGANModel/' 
 
IDS_Saved_Path = SavedModelPath + 'B_B_IDSModel/' 
 
# Global Variables 
N_FEATURES = 76 
 
IDS_INPUT_DIM = N_FEATURES 
IDS_OUTPUT_DIM = 2 
attack_type = ['DDoS'] 
 
fun_feature = {'DDoS': DDoS_FEATURES} 
non_fun_feature = {} 
for atck_cat, pos_functional_feature in fun_feature.items():  
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non_fun_feature = {} 
for atck_cat, pos_functional_feature in fun_feature.items(): 
    nonfuntional_feature = [] 
    for i in range(N_FEATURES): 
        if i not in pos_functional_feature: 
            nonfuntional_feature.append(i) 
    non_fun_feature[atck_cat] = nonfuntional_feature 
 
IDS_MODELS = {'RF'} 
 
def create_batch(x,batch_size): 
    a = list(range(len(x))) 
    np.random.shuffle(a) 
    x = x[a] 
    batch_x = [x[batch_size * i : (i+1)*batch_size,:] for i in range(len(x)//batc
h_size)] 
    return np.array(batch_x) 
 
def prepro_attack_data(dataset, atck_cat): 
    if atck_cat != 'DDoS': 
      raise ValueError("Data Preprocessing failed: category not found") 
    attack_data = dataset[dataset['class'] == atck_cat] 
    del attack_data["class"] 
    return np.array(attack_data) 
 
def get_ids_path(model_name, atck_cat, created_date): 
    if atck_cat != 'DOS': 
        raise ValueError("Data Preprocessing failed: category not found") 
    ids_path = str(f"{IDS_Saved_Path}{atck_cat}/ML/from_{cre-
ated_date}_{model_name}.pkl") 
    if not os.path.exists(ids_path): 
        raise ValueError(f"Invalid path: {ids_path}\nfile does not exist!") 
    return ids_path 
 
#IDS Models 
def load_ids(model_name, atck_cat, created_date): 
    ids_model_path = get_ids_path(model_name, atck_cat, created_date) 
    with open(ids_model_path, 'rb') as file: 
        pickle_model = pickle.load(file) 
        print(f"{4*' '}IDS Loaded from: {ids_model_path}") 





# Initialize the Generator 
def init_generator(input_dim, output_dim): 
    generator = Generator(input_dim, output_dim) 
    return generator 
 
def create_adversarial_DDoS_attack(generator, noise_dim, raw_atk, atck_cat): 
    batch_size = len(raw_atk) 
    noise = V(th.Tensor(np.random.uniform(0,1,(batch_size, noise_dim)))) 
    gen_out = generator(noise) 
    adv_DDoS_attack = create_adversarial_DDoS_at-
tack(gen_out, raw_atk, atck_cat, non_fun_feature) 
    return adv_DDoS_attack 
 
def train_generator(generator, discriminator, opt_gen, noise_dim, attack_traf-
fic, atck_cat): 
    for p in discriminator.parameters():   
        p.requires_grad = False 
    opt_gen.zero_grad()         
    # Generator Generate Adversarial Attack 
    adv_DDoS_attack = create_adversarial_DDoS_attack(generator, noise_dim, at-
tack_traffic, atck_cat) 
    # GAN-D predict, Generator update parameter 
    D_pred = discriminator(adv_DDoS_attack) 
    g_loss = -th.mean(D_pred) 
    g_loss.backward() 
    opt_gen.step() 
    return g_loss 
 
def train_discriminator(discriminator, ids_model, generator, critic_iters, 
opt_disc, normal_b, noise_dim, attack_traffic, atck_cat): 
    run_d_loss = 0 
    cnt = 0 
    for p in discriminator.parameters(): 
 p.requires_grad = True 
 
    for c in range(critic_iters): 




adv_DDoS_attack = create_adversarial_DDoS_attack(generator, noise_dim, attack_tra
ffic, atck_cat) 
         
        ids_input = th.cat((adv_DDoS_attack,normal_b)) 
        l = list(range(len(ids_input))) 
        np.random.shuffle(l) 
        ids_input = V(th.Tensor(ids_input[l])) 
         
        ids_pred_label = V(th.Tensor(ids_model.predict(ids_input))) 
        pred_normal = ids_input[ids_pred_label==0] 
        pred_attack = ids_input[ids_pred_label==1] 
        if len(pred_attack) == 0: 
            cnt += 1 
            break 
         
        Disc_Normal = discriminator(V(th.Tensor(pred_normal))) 
        Disc_Attack = discriminator(V(th.Tensor(pred_attack))) 
         
        loss_normal = th.mean(Disc_Normal) 
        loss_attack = th.mean(Disc_Attack) 
        gradient_penalty = calculate_penalty(discriminator, normal_b.data, adv_DD
oS_attack.data) 
        d_loss = loss_attack - loss_normal 
        d_loss.backward() 
        opt_disc.step() 
        run_d_loss += d_loss.item() 
    return run_d_loss, cnt 
 
# Calculate Penalty 
def calculate_penalty(D, normal_t, attack_t): 
    alpha = th.Tensor(np.random.random((normal_t.shape[0], 1))) 
    between_n_a = (alpha * normal_t + ((1 -
 alpha) * attack_t)).requires_grad_(True) 
    d_between_n_a = D(between_n_a) 
    adv = V(th.Tensor(normal_t.shape[0], 1).fill_(1.0), requires_grad=False) 
    gradients = autograd.grad( 
        outputs=d_between_n_a, 
        inputs=between_n_a, 
   grad_outputs=adv, 
        create_graph=True, 
        retain_graph=True, 
        only_inputs=True, 




gradients = gradients.view(gradients.size(0), -1) 
    gradient_penalty = ((gradients.norm(2, dim=1) - 1) ** 2).mean() 
    return gradient_penalty 
 
def cal_dr(ids_model, normal, raw_atk, adv_DDoS_attack): 
    # Make data to feed IDS contain: Attack & Normal 
    o_ids_input = th.cat((raw_atk, normal)) 
    a_ids_input = th.cat((adv_DDoS_attack,normal)) 
    # Shuffle Input 
    l = list(range(len(a_ids_input))) 
    np.random.shuffle(l) 
    o_ids_input = o_ids_input[l] 
    a_ids_input = a_ids_input[l] 
    # IDS Predict Label 
    o_pred_label = th.Tensor(ids_model.predict(o_ids_input)) 
    a_pred_label = th.Tensor(ids_model.predict(a_ids_input)) 
    # True Label 
    ids_true_label = np.r_[np.ones(BATCH_SIZE),np.zeros(BATCH_SIZE)][l] 
    # Calc DR 
    tn1, fn1, fp1, tp1 = confusion_matrix(ids_true_label,o_pred_label).ravel() 
    tn2, fn2, fp2, tp2 = confusion_matrix(ids_true_label,a_pred_label).ravel() 
    origin_dr = tp1/(tp1 + fp1) 
    adversarial_dr = tp2/(tp2 + fp2) 
    return origin_dr, adversarial_dr 
 
ids_ml_model_name = "RF" 
ids_created_date = 'Auto' 
if ids_created_date == 'Auto': 
    ids_created_date = IDS_Model_Created_Auto[ids_ml_model_name] 
    print(f"IDS: {ids_ml_model_name} - created on: \t{ids_created_date}") 
GAN_variant = 'WGAN' 
 
# Hyper-parameters 
BATCH_SIZE = 256 
learning_rate = 0.0001 
LAMBDA = 10 
CRITIC_ITERS = 5 
 
# GAN-D 
D_INPUT_DIM = N_FEATURES 
D_OUTPUT_DIM = 1 
discriminator = Discriminator(D_INPUT_DIM,D_OUTPUT_DIM) 




g_train_data = pd.read_csv(g_trainset_path) 
d_train_data = pd.read_csv(d_trainset_path) 
 
del d_train_data["class"] 
normal = np.array(d_train_data) 
 
print("Amout of Generator Trainset:", g_train_data.shape[0]) 
print("Amout of Discriminator Trainset:", d_train_data.shape[0]) 
 
for atck_cat in attack_type: 
    total_time_start = timeit.default_timer() 
 
    # Load IDS 
    ids_model = load_ids(ids_ml_model_name, atck_cat, ids_cr    eated_date) 
     
    # Initialize the Generator 
    G_OUTPUT_DIM = len(non_fun_feature[atck_cat]) # Generator o utput is number o
f nonfunctional feature 
    print(f"nf : {G_OUTPUT_DIM} (num. of nonfunctional features)")     
    G_INPUT_DIM = NOISE_DIM 
    print(f"Generator noise_vector_dim : {NOISE_DIM}") 
    print(f"Generator input_feat_dim : {G_INPUT_DIM}") 
    print(f"Generator out_dim: {G_OUTPUT_DIM}") 
    generator = init_generator(G_INPUT_DIM,G_OUTPUT_DIM,) 
    opt_gen = optim.Adam(generator.parameters(), lr=learning_rate) 
    # Load Raw Attack Dataset 
    raw_atk = prepro_attack_data(g_train_data, atck_cat) 
    # Prepare Save Folder 
    ids_path = str(f"{GAN_Model_Path}ML/{ids_ml_model_name}/") 
    if not os.path.exists(ids_path): 
        os.makedirs(ids_path) 
          GAN_Save_Path = str(f"{ids_path}{atck_cat}") 
    if not os.path.exists(GAN_Save_Path): 
        os.makedirs(GAN_Save_Path) 
 
# Create batch of attack traffic 
batch_attack = create_batch(raw_atk,BATCH_SIZE) 
# Declare Loss, DR List and Train Generator, GAN-D 
d_losses,g_losses = [],[] 






# IDS Training Started 
print(f"-->IDSGAN start training") 
for epoch in range(MAX_EPOCH): 
    batch_normal = create_batch(normal,BATCH_SIZE) 
      epoch_time_start = timeit.default_timer() 
      cnt = 0 
      run_g_loss = 0. 
      run_d_loss = 0. 
      epoch_o_drs, epoch_a_drs = [], [] 
 
      for idx, bn in enumerate(batch_normal): 
            normal_b = th.Tensor(bn.astype("float64")) 
            attack_traffic  = V(th.Tensor(batch_attack[idx % len(batch_attack)])) 
            #  Train Generator 
            g_loss = train_generator(generator, discriminator, opt_gen, NOISE_DIM
, attack_traffic, atck_cat) 
            run_g_loss += g_loss.item() 
 
            # Train Discriminator 
            d_loss, current_cnt = train_discriminator(discriminator, ids_model, g
enerator, CRITIC_ITERS, opt_disc, normal_b, NOISE_DIM, attack_traffic, atck_cat) 
            run_d_loss += d_loss 
            cnt += current_cnt 
                 
            # CALC Epoch DR 
            adv_DDoS_attack = create_adversarial_DDoS_attack(generator, NOISE_DIM
, attack_traffic, atck_cat).detach() 
            origin_dr, adversarial_dr = cal_dr(ids_model, normal_b, attack_traffi
c, adv_DDoS_attack) 
            epoch_o_drs.append(origin_dr) 
            epoch_a_drs.append(adversarial_dr) 
 
if cnt >= (len(normal)/BATCH_SIZE): 
            print("predicted attack does not exist") 
            break 
            d_losses.append(run_d_loss/CRITIC_ITERS) 
        g_losses.append(run_g_loss) 
        epoch_o_dr = np.mean(epoch_o_drs) 
        epoch_a_dr = np.mean(epoch_a_drs) 
        o_dr.append(epoch_o_dr) 
        a_dr.append(epoch_a_dr) 




for val in print_vals: 
            if isinstance(val, float): 
                print_string.append(str(f"{val:.2f}")) 
            else: 
                print_string.append(str(val)) 
             
        if (epoch == 0 or (epoch + 1) % 10 == 0): 
            model_g_save_name = f"time_created_{today}_GAN_G_{epoch+1}epoch.pth" 
            path = GAN_Save_Path + model_g_save_name 
            th.save(generator.state_dict(), path)             
 
overall_running_time = timeit.default_timer() - total_time_start 
# Save Model 
model_d_save_name = f"time_created_{today}_GAN_D_{MAX_EPOCH}epoch.pth" 
path = GAN_Save_Path + model_d_save_name 
th.save(discriminator.state_dict(), path) 
print(f"Total model runtime: {overall_running_time:.2f}") 
 
plt.plot(d_losses,label = "Discriminator_Loss") 




plt.plot(o_dr,label = "Origin DR") 




# Evaluate adversarial DDoS data 
for atck_cat in attack_type:         
    # Load sklearn IDS Model 
    ids_model = load_ids(ids_ml_model_name, atck_cat, ids_cr    eated_date) 
    # Init Generator model 
    G_OUTPUT_DIM = len(non_fun_feature[atck_cat]) # Generator I nput dimension is
 dimention of noise 
    print(f"nf: {G_OUTPUT_DIM} (num. of nonfunctional features)") 
    G_INPUT_DIM = NOISE_DIM 
    print(f"Generator noise_vector_dim : {NOISE_DIM}") 
    print(f"Generator input_feat_dim : {G_INPUT_DIM}") 
    print(f"Generator out_dim: {G_OUTPUT_DIM}") 




# Load Attack Dataset 
    test_raw_atk = prepro_attack_data(testset, atck_cat) 
    # Create batch of attack traffic 
    batch_attack = create_batch(test_raw_atk, BATCH_SIZE) 
    n_batch_attack = len(batch_attack) 
    print(f"{4*' '}Amout of {atck_cat}:\t{len(test_raw_atk)} ({n_batch_attack} ba
tchs - {BATCH_SIZE} records/batch)") 
     
    # Calculate Detection Rate for each epoch 
    gan_g_folder_path = str(f"{GAN_Model_Path}ML/{ids_ml_model_name}/{atck_cat}") 
    print(f"{4*' '}GAN Models Folder: {gan_g_folder_path}") 
    for epoch in range(0, MAX_EPOCH + 1, 10): 
        # Load Generator Model 
        model_g_save_name = f"time_created_{gan_model_time_created}_GAN_G_{1 if e
poch == 0 else epoch}epoch.pth" 
        gan_g_model_path = gan_g_folder_path + model_g_save_name 
        param = th.load(gan_g_model_path,map_location=lambda x,y:x) 
        generator.load_state_dict(param) 
        generator.eval() 
 
        o_dr,a_dr =[],[] 
        with th.no_grad(): 
            for idx, bn in enumerate(test_batch_normal): 
                normal_b = th.Tensor(bn) 
                attack_b = th.Tensor(batch_attack[idx % n_batch_attack]) 
                # Generate Adversarial Traffic 
                adv_DDoS_attack_b = create_adversarial_DDoS_attack(generator, NOI
SE_DIM, attack_b, atck_cat).detach() 
 
 # Calculate Detection Rate 
      origin_dr, adversarial_dr = cal_dr(ids_model, normal_b, attack_b, adversary
al_attack_b) 
      o_dr.append(origin_dr) 
      a_dr.append(adversarial_dr) 
      eir = 1 - (np.mean(a_dr)/np.mean(o_dr)) 
      print(f"\t {epoch:3d} epochs:\tOrigin DR : {np.mean(o_dr)*100:.2f}% \t Adve
rsarial DR : {np.mean(a_dr)*100:.2f}% \t EIR : {eir*100:.2f}%") 
 
 
 
